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I. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE, PRIMARILY
BEING AN ATTEMPT TO PROCEDURALLY DISTRACT THIS COURT
FROM THE BONA FIDE ISSUES AND MERITS OF THIS APPEAL.
Ignoring the contract provision it wrote, that "all
disputes" be arbitrated, and paying no heed to the Federal
and State legislative and judicial policies favoring
arbitration and requiring that arbitrable disputes be placed
in arbitration as rapidly as possible, Docutel-Olivetti [in
response to Systems1 and Brady's simple demand for
arbitration] has compelled Systems and Brady through a
procedural economic death march over the last eleven months,
thereby sky rocketing legal fees to a level in excess of
$50,000.00 per side in its endless attempt to avoid, if
possible, arbitration of its claim, which Docutel-Olivetti
values at a mere $49,000.00. One procedural maneuver has
been superimposed upon another by Docutel-Olivetti. Often
the same procedural tactic has been repeated several times.
Predictably, on this appeal, Docutel-Olivetti continues
its effort to avoid the merits of the appeal in lieu of
burdensome, endless and non-meritorious procedural
arguments. For example, Docutel-Olivetti, devotes the first
331/2 pages of its 49 page Brief to jurisdiction and other
alleged procedural deficiencies.
The intent of Docutel-Olivetti [which has not cross
appealed here] is to fragment and dilute the nature of this
appeal in the hope of distracting the Court's attention from
the merits of the appeal by addressing non-existing
procedural issues, not raised below. For example only,
-1-

Docutel-Olivetti did not challenge below the Trial Court's
decision to apply the 1985 UAA, but now, for the first time,
attempts to do so, rather than to meaningfully respond to
the bona fide issues of the appeal.
Also, Docutel-Olivetti, by its "matters of record"
assertions, attempts to obscure this Court's understanding
of Systems' and Brady's contentions as to what has happened
below, before this Court on Motions, before Judge Greene in
Federal Court, before the Tenth Circuit and before the
American Arbitration Association (AAA).
At the same time, Docutel-Olivetti inconsistently asks
this Court to look beyond the so-called "record" so far as
Docutel-Olivetti's arguments are concerned. DocutelOlivetti 's reasons for asking this Court to apply a dual
standard to the "record on appeal" are two fold.
First, Docutel-Olivetti hopes to prevail by causing
ambiguity and uncertainty to replace clarity as to events
favorable to Systems and Brady. Second, Docutel-Olivetti
wishes to conceal from this Court several major and
prejudicial inconsistencies in the positions of DocutelOlivetti, in the five forums identified above.
Docutel-Olivetti should not be permitted to impose an
artificial limitation on this Court's knowledge of all
relevant events. Indeed, since all events in the five
aforementioned forums relate to a common arbitration matter,
where there has been no examined and cross-examined
witnesses, and no trial evidence per se, common sense as
-2-

well as the Rules of this Court strongly indicate that a
meritorious resolution of this appeal necessitates that this
Court be accurately informed of the events in this and all
other related proceedings. See also Rules 106 and 201, Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 37(a), U.R.A.P.
II. THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
APPEAL IS RELEVANT TO PROCEEDINGS HEREIN.
The corresponding Tenth Circuit appeal and cross appeal
have been reinstated following filing of the Brief of
Systems and Brady herein. (A. 107).
The reinstatement represents a material change in
circumstances, which was properly brought to the attention
of this Court by Systems and Brady. Seemingly, however,
Docutel-Olivetti ignores the reinstatement in its Brief.
Instead, Docutel-Olivetti attempts to convince this
Court that it cannot review Judge Wilkinson's State Court
anti-arbitration Order because of the existence of Judge
Greene's Federal arbitration Order. At the same time,
Docutel-Olivetti is arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the
FAA §4 issues were submitted to and resolved by Judge
Wilkinson, and are, therefore, not properly in Federal
Court. The impact, or lack thereof, of Judge Greene's Order
on this appeal is set forth in Section V of this Reply
Brief.
III. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION: THE ORDERS OF JUDGE
WILKINSON ARE FINAL: THIS APPEAL IS ONE OF RIGHT.

-3-

In a calculated and intentional effort to side step the
merits and substance of this appeal and contrary to Rule
24(k), U.R.A.P., Docutel-Olivetti, in Points II and III of
its ARGUMENT [pages 18-32 of Respondent's Brief], presents,
once more, its ill-founded and already four times rejected
theories respecting the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme
Court over the present appeal.
A.

Docutel-Olivetti!s Attack on
Jurisdiction is Untimely

<

Ignoring momentarily the prior orders of this Court
vouchsafing jurisdiction, Docutel-Olivetti's present attack
on jurisdiction can be rejected with finality because it is
untimely. The interval of time during which a jurisdictional
question may be raised by a party before the Utah Supreme
Court is controlled by Rule 10(a), U.R.A.P., i.e.:
(a) Time for Filing; Grounds for Motion. Within 10
days after the docketing statement is served, a party
may move:
(1) to dismiss the appeal ... on the basis
that the Court has no jurisdiction;...
Docutel-Olivettifs present jurisdictional attack
occurred on or about November 22, 1985, when DocutelOlivetti f s Brief was filed. However, the Docketing Statement
of Systems and Brady was served on August 16, 1985. The time
span between the two events is approximately 3 months, as
opposed to the 10 day limit imposed by Rule 10(a) U.R.A.P.
The apparent intent of Rule 10(a) is to require the
presentation of bona fide jurisdictional questions to this
-4-

Court at a very early point in t.he appeal so that, if
jurisdiction doesn't exist, the burden upon the Court and
the parties can be immediately terminated.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide no
express exception to the 10 day restriction of Rule 10(a)
and, therefore, the present [November 22, 1985] attack on
jurisdiction is not timely.
While, in an appropriate case of manifest error, or
complexity, or newly discovered evidence, this Court could
belatedly [following the submission of briefs, for example],
consider a bona fide issue of jurisdiction, such is not the
case here. Docutel-Olivetti has merely reasserted the same
old, stale, transparent, hollow, contrived and four times
rejected arguments, in support of its present attack on
jurisdiction.
B.

Docutel-Olivettifs Arguments
Respecting Jurisdiction are Frivolous
Docutel-Olivetti on June 24, 1985 conceded [in Federal

Court] the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
as follows:
Whatever else the May 24, 1985 State Court decision
[i.e. the June 10, 1985 Order] is it is clear that it
is not interlocutory....
Section 78-31a-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act [The
1985 UAA] ... provides:
"78-31a-19. An appeal may be taken ... from any
court order:
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration."
-5-

Judge Wilkinson 1 s May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [May 10,
1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-l9 U.C.A. and
is not interlocutory. (Emphasis supplied; A.28).
Thus, Docutel-Olivetti cannot now be heard to contend
it did not know, as of June 24, 1985, that the present
matter is appealable as a matter of right, is not interlocutory and that this Court has jurisdiction.
The initial appeal in this matter was Docket 20783,
filed prematurely on July 8,1985. On July 10, 1985,
notwithstanding its aforementioned concessions in Federal
Court, Docutel-Olivetti challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court by filing a Motion to Dismiss Appeal [Docket 20783]
contending the appeal was interlocutory and governed by Rule
5, U.R.A.P. [as opposed to Rule 4, U.R.A.P.]. (A.109,110).
Docutel-Olivettifs assertions were rejected by this Court
when it ruled that Appeal 20783 was governed by Rule 4
[Appeal as of Right], but was unacceptably premature.
(A.111).
A new Notice of Appeal was, thereafter, timely filed in
this matter, resulting in present Docket No. 20835. Again,
Docutel-Olivetti filing a Motion to Dismiss Appeal 20835 on
the same ground, i.e. that it was a Rule 5, U.R.A.P.
interlocutory appeal. (A.112,113).
Docutel-Olivetti also argued that the 1985 UAA was not
procedural and, therefore, not retroactive, contrary to the
express language of the Bill maturing into the 1985 UAA.
(A.79,116,117). No such argument was made by DocutelOlivetti before the Trial Court.
-6-

The Utah Supreme Court on September 3, 1985 rejected
Docutel-Olivettifs theories respecting its jurisdiction over
the present appeal and denied Docutel-Olivettifs Motion to
Dismiss in Docket 20835. (A. 118).
For a third time, Docutel-Olivetti made the same
arguments respecting jurisdiction in its Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Stay Pending Federal
Appeal, filed on or about September 19, 1985 in this Docket
20835. (A. 143). This third attack on jurisdiction was also
rejected.
For a fourth time, Docutel-Olivetti, on the same
grounds, challenged jurisdiction in its Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff-Respondent's Motions filed on or about
September 18, 1985 in this Docket 20835. (A. 147). This
jurisdictional attack was likewise rejected.
The arguments, now made for the fifth time, in support
of Docutel-Olivetti's present [November 22, 1985] attack on
jurisdiction are the same well-worn, but four times rejected
contentions and have no more merit now than when they were
four times earlier presented and rejected.
C.

This Appeal is One of Right and Judge
Wilkinson's Orders are Final Orders
This appeal is one of right and Judge Wilkinson's

Orders of June 10, 1985 and July 19, 1985 are final orders
for the reasons summarized below.
1.

Docutel-Olivetti has accurately conceded and is

bound by its earliery admission against present interest,
-7-

made by its counsel as an officer of the Court, before Judge
Greene in this matter, i.e.:
Judge Wilkinson1s May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [June
10, 1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-19 U.C.A.
and is not interlocutory. (A.28).
2.

The decision of the State Trial Court was pursuant

to the 1985 UAA, making this appeal one of statutory right.
(R. 271). The State Trial Court's application of the 1985
UAA, cannot be reviewed on a jurisdictional-dismissal basis,
where the Trial Court applied the 1985 UAA. Only by
exercising the jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
1985 UAA and ruling on the merits of the appeal per se can
this Court resolve the issue of whether Judge Wilkinson
correctly applied the 1985 UAA.
3.

The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make a

distinction between appeals as of right, under Rule 4,
U.R.A.P., and discretionary appeals from interlocutory
orders, under Rule 5 U.R.A.P.
This Court applied Rule 4, U.R.A.P. [and, therefore,
rejected Docutel-Olivettifs Rule 5 argument] in Docket
20783. The mandate in Appeal 20783 has been returned to the
District Court and the Rule 4, U.R.A.P. dismissal Order
(A. 111) is res judicata upon the parties as to the issues
so decided.
4.

The 1985 UAA applies in this matter because it is

procedural by its terms, and, therefore, is retroactive. See
page 36 of the Brief of Systems and Brady. Systems and
-8-

Brady, on May 24, 1985, asked the State Trial Court to apply
the 1985 UAA and to grant them relief consisting of, among
other things, an order of arbitration. (R. 274). Judge
Wilkinson refused to compel arbitration and instead, in his
June 10, 1985 anti-arbitration Order, compelled Systems and
Brady to Answer Docutel-Olivettifs Complaint, in violation
of the contract right of Systems and Brady that "all
disputes11 be arbitrated. Accordingly, Systems and Brady have
appealed Judge Wilkinson's anti-arbitration order of June
10, 1985 and the companion Order of July 19, 1985, as a
matter of statutory right under 78-31a-19, U.C.A., which
states:
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from any
court order:
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration.
5.

Even if Docutel-Olivettifs argument that the

pre-1985 UAA controls here were correct [which it is not],
the anti-arbitration Orders of June 10, 1985 and July 19,
1985 are final orders [under the pre-1985 UAA when Lindon
City v. Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah,
1985) is also considered] and, therefore, appealable as a
matter or right because they deny, with finality, the
contract right of Systems and Brady to arbitrate "all
disputes".
6.

Independent of the exact state statutory basis for

jurisdiction in this appeal, the FAA and 28 U.S.C. § 1291
provide an independent jurisdictional basis where, as here,
-9-

the transactions in question impinge materially upon
interstate commerce. The anti-arbitration decisions and
Orders of Judge Wilkinson are final under federal statutes
because they expressly undertake to deny Systems and Brady
the right to arbitrate "all disputes" and because Judge
Wilkinson reversibly failed to implement a stay order under
FAA §3 respecting the FAA §4 arbitration issues placed in
Federal Court.
7.

The United States Supreme Court, in Southland

Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.
2d 1 (1984), has created controlling precedent and
established a binding policy, applicable in the present
matter, which requires that the Utah Supreme Court hear this
appeal at the present time because Judge Wilkinson's
anti-arbitration orders are final orders and the mentioned
policy requires immediate review.
D.

Even if the pre-1985 UAA and the 1985 UAA
Do Not Confer Jurisdition, the FAA Does.
The argument of Docutel-Olivetti that the FAA

supercedes [preempts] both the pre-1985 UAA and the 1985
UAA, if true (which it is not), does not deprive this Court
of jurisdiction, because the FAA independently confers
appellate jurisdiction upon this Court. Since this matter
involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies to questions
of jurisdiction in both federal and state courts.
More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Southland, supra, at 104 S. Ct. 856, 857 stated:
-10-

... the failure to accord immediate review of the
decision of the California Supreme Court might
"seriously erode federal policy." Plainly, the effect
of the judgment of the California court is to nullify a
valid contract made by private parties under which they
agreed to submit all contract disputes to final,
binding arbitration. The federal Act permits "parties
to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible,"
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by
allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to
the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged
litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate,.,.

For us [or any otheir appellate Court] to delay
review of a. state -judicial decisionL denying enforceme•nt
of the cont.ract to arbi.trate until the state court
litigat ion has run its course wouldI defeat the core
purpose of a contract to arbitrate. (Citations omitted;
Emphasis added.)
Under Southland, this Court is required to rule on the
merits of present appeal and not, on a jurisdictional basis,
deny the enforcement of the interstate commerce contract
between the parties to arbitrate "all disputes" by allowing
State Court litigation to first run its course.
IV. THE 1985 UAA ISSUES WERE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL
COURT AND THE RULING WAS PURSUANT TO THE 1985 UAA.
Docutel-Olivetti1s argument that the 1985 UAA was not
before the Trial Court is mythical and clearly erroneous.
The Motion for Stay Pending Arbitration itself was filed to prevent
default before 1985 UAA took retroactive effect, but was not
noticed for hearing. It was expected that the FAA §4 issues
would first be resolved in Federal Court, after which the
parties would return to State Court for appropriate relief.
-1 1-

On May 2, 1985, Judge Bruce J e n k i n s asked t h a t

the

S t a t e Court i s s u e s be h e a r d f i r s t and c o n t i n u e d t h e h e a r i n g
on t h e F e d e r a l Court i s s u e s u n t i l May 31/ 1985. Judge
J e n k i n s asked t h a t t h e S t a t e Court h e a r i n g be a c c e l e r a t e d .
Thus, time was s h o r t .

(A.

7,8).

D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i f s overdue Memorandum r e s p e c t i n g t h e
Motion i n q u e s t i o n was not s e r v e d by m a i l u n t i l May 16,
1985. There was i n s u f f i c i e n t

time remaining b e f o r e t h e May

24, 1985 h e a r i n g t o f i l e an a d d i t i o n a l memorandum.
Given t h e r e p e a l of t h e p r e - 1 9 8 5 UAA (A.79; R.74) and
t h e r e t r o a c t i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e 1985 UAA, t h e only
s t a t e s t a t u t e a v a i l a b l e f o r Judge Wilkinson t o r u l e upon was
t h e 1985 UAA. If Judge Wilkinson had r u l e d under t h e
r e p e a l e d p r e - 1 9 8 5 UAA (which he d i d n o t ) , such would have
been c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s and r e v e r s i b l e

error.

At t h e May 24, 1985 h e a r i n g , t h e Motion of Systems and
Brady was argued on t h e b a s i s of t h e 1985 UAA and t h e Court
was asked t o not only g r a n t a s t a y under t h e 1985 UAA and
p u r s u a n t t o FAA § 3 , b u t t o o r d e r a r b i t r a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o t h e
1985 UAA. More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,

Systems and Brady

an i s s u e b e f o r e Judge Wilkinson as
1.

characterized

follows:

Should t h i s Court o r d e r a r b i t r a t i o n ?

(R.274).

Systems and Brady also argued at the May 24, 1985 h e a r i n g :
Since t h i s action has been filed, and after Defendants filed
t h e i r Motion . . . the Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31A-1 became
effective April 29, 1985 and Title 78 Chapter 31 has been
repealed. The enrolled copy of Senate Bill 62 declares i t to be
"an act relating to the Judicial Code; providing a revised
procedure for the enforement of written arbitration agreements."'
-12-

It is well established in Utah that procedural statutes have
retroactive effect.
... the legislature determined the new arbitration act as a
procedural matter
Defendants believe, therefore, that the new
statute should be applied to these proceedings. (R.276).
The 1985 UAA was provided to the Trial Court. (R.74-83).
While professing a lack of information respecting the
1985 UAA, Docutel-Olivetti did not claim suprise and ask for
a continuance to consider the 1985 UAA. Instead, DocutelOlivetti waived any continuance available and submitted the
matter at the May 24, 1985 hearing.
The July 22, 1985 uncontroverted Affidavit of John R. Merkling
also confirms that the 1985 UAA was before Judge Wilkinson:
10. Based on the arguments which I heard before
Judge Wilkinson, the issue of compelling arbitration
under the new 1985 Utah Arbitration Act was explicitly
raised and argued before Judge Wilkinson. (A.120).
The understanding of Docutel-Olivetti and its counsel
is no different:
Judge Wilkinson's May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [the
June 10, 1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-19
U.C.A. and is not interlocutory. (A.28).
The same is confirmed by the Objection of Systems and
Brady to the June 10, 1985 Order which states:
4. The [June 10, 1985] Order should state that the
Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31a-1, et seq. was ...
considered by the Court as controlling. (R.103).
In response to the above-mentioned Objection,
Docutel-Olivetti did not in any way challenge the applicabi-13-

lity

of t h e

198 5 UAA, nor t h a t t h e matter had been argued f

submitted and ruled upon under the 1985 UAA. D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i has
conceded t h a t Judge Wilkinson "ruled primarily on Utah law." (R.351 ) .
On no o c c a s i o n ,

at the t r i a l

level,

O l i v e t t i challenge the a p p l i c a b i l i t y

did

of t h e

Docutel1985 UAA, n o r

object t o t h e arguments of Systems and Brady t h a t the 1985 UAA c o n t r o l s
nor objected t o t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g b a s e d on t h e
Docutel-Olivetti
at this

h a s n o t a p p e a l e d i n t h i s m a t t e r and may n o t

late date raise

whether the

198 5 UAA.

for the f i r s t

time a question as

1985 UAA was p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e T r i a l

to

Court.

V. THERE ARE ISSUES UPON WHICH THIS COURT
I S REQUIRED TO RULE.
Docutel-Olivetti
authority,

that

argues,

in l i g h t

again without c i t i n g

of t h e FAA, t h e r e a r e no

upon w h i c h t h i s C o u r t c a n e n t e r a r u l i n g .

any
issues

This c o n t e n t i o n

b a s e d upon t h e e r r o n e o u s p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e FAA, e n a c t e d
1928, preempts t h e f i e l d ,

including the

1985 UAA. Such

s i m p l y n o t t h e law and n e v e r h a s b e e n ,

any more t h a n

federal

securities

securities

laws p r e - e m p t

C o u r t c a n i s s u e an a r b i t r a t i o n

state

order under s t a t e

i t c a n n o t award l e s s r e l i e f
Also,

Docutel-Olivetti

in
is

the

laws.
law,

s c o p e of w h i c h i s b r o a d e r t h a n r e q u i r e d by F e d e r a l

is

This

the

law,

but

t h a n t h a t p r o v i d e d by t h e FAA.
a d d r e s s e s t h e A u g u s t 8,

1985 FAA

§4 Order of Judge Greene (A. 159-161) as if i t were f i n a l in a r e s
j u d i c a t a sense. To the contrary, Judge Greene f s Order has been appealed
by both p a r t i e s and both appeals have been r e i n s t a t e d .

(A. 107) .

Furthermore, while calmly representing to this Court
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t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n i s s u e s under t h e FAA were p r o p e r l y
before and decided in Federal Court, Docutel-Olivetti inconsistently in
i t s Tenth Circuit Docketing Statement, has taken a contradictory
posture, i . e . : that Systems and Brady s u b m i t t e d t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s
t o Judge Wilkinson i n S t a t e C o u r t .

(A. 1 3 2 - 1 3 5 ) .

Should D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i p r e v a i l i n t h e F e d e r a l
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s were b e f o r e Judge
W i l k i n s o n , t h e f a i l u r e by Judge Wilkinson t o apply FAA §4
would be s q u a r e l y b e f o r e t h e Utah Supreme c o u r t , under t h e
S o u t h l a n d d e c i s i o n , which a t 104 S . C t .

859, 860,

states:

. . . the substantive law the Act [FAA] created was applicable
in state and federal court
We thus read the underlying issue
of a r b i t r a b i l i t y to be a question of substantive federal law: "
the [federal] Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state
or federal court." . . .
. . . the "involving commerce" requirement . . . [is] not — an
inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but
. . . [is] intended to apply in state and federal courts. (Emphasis
added; Citation Omitted.)
Thus, i f t h e Tenth C i r c u i t r u l e s t h a t t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s
were b e f o r e Judge Wilkinson Judge W i l k i n s o n ' s f a i l u r e

to

r u l e under FAA §4 i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and t h i s Court would
have an uncompromised duty under Southland t o t h e n r u l e on
t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s .
This s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y why Systems and Brady, by
Motion b e f o r e t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t , s u g g e s t e d t h e p r e s e n t
a p p e a l be s t a y e d pending a d e c i s i o n by t h e Tenth C i r c u i t .
Thus, t h e Utah Supreme Court has b e f o r e i t not only t h e
1985 UAA and o t h e r i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d in t h e B r i e f of Brady
and Systems, but may u l t i m a t e l y be o b l i g a t e d t o d e c i d e
FAA §4 i s s u e s .
-15-

all

VI. SERVICE OF A SUMMONS IS NOT REQUIRED WHERE A
MOTION FOR ARBITRATION IS MADE IN A PENDING PROCEEDING.
Docutel-Olivetti argues in its Brief, for the first
time, that Systems and Brady's Motion regarding arbitration
is deficient because it was not served by summons.
The purpose of a summons is elemental, i.e., service
thereof confers initial jurisdiction upon the trial court.
There are other ways of conferring jurisdiction, e.g. by
stipulation or by a general appearance. However, once
jurisdiction has been obtained, the court may act thereafter
on all matters relevant to the proceeding.
Here, had jurisdiction not existed previously, the use
of a summons under the 1985 UAA would have been appropriate
to create jurisdiction. However, given the existing
jurisdiction of the Trial Court pursuant to Docutel-Olivetti's
Complaint and Summons, nothing more than the Motion to Stay
Pending Arbitration was jurisdictionally needed preliminary
to Judge Wilkinson's ruling under the 1985 UAA.
Had Docutel-Olivetti possessed a true objection to
"service of process", that objection would have been raised
below. It was not, and is, therefore, waived.
VII. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI MISAPPLIES UTAH CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD TO ARBITRATION PROVISIONS.
Docutel-Olivetti erroneously characterizes paragraph 12
of its Agreement [which, with absolute specificity, provides
that "all disputes" are arbitrable] as a "general" provision
and, at the same time, characterizes paragraph 10 [which
-16-

refers to UCC remedies] as a "specific" provision. On this
false premise, Docute 1-01 ivetti draws the misplaced conclusion
that paragraph 10 must prevail over paragraph 12 because
specific contract provisions control over general provisions.
Paragraph 12 of the Agreement, while broad in its
scope, is neither general nor ambiguous under Utah law.
Interpreting remarkably similar contract language in Lindon
Cityy supra, this Court found that contract language
providing that "... All claims, disputes and other matters
in question arising out of or related to the CONTRACT
DOCUMENTS or breach thereof ... shall be decided by
arbitration ..." was "plain, clear wording,"
The language in the Agreement before this Court in this
case is just as plain, clear and specific. Resort to general principles
of contract interpretation is not required. Under the Utah law "all
disputes" means "all disputes" and arbitration is required.
Also, if there is any element of ambiguity, both state
and federal law of contract interpretation requires that the
contract be interpreted in favor of arbitration unless a
clearly expressed intent not to arbitrate an issue can be
found, which is not the case here. See Point I of Systems'
and Brady's Brief and cases cited therein.
Docutel-Olivetti does not deal in any way with the
policy argument found in Systems' and Brady's Brief, at
Point I. The principles cited there refer specifically to
interpretation of arbitration clauses. In summary, Federal
and Utah policy require that arbitration provisions be interpreted
-17-

in favor of arbitration. General principles of contract law
do not override the stated Federal and Utah policy.
Finally, Docutel-Olivetti!s position is fundamentally
flawed in characterizing paragraph 12 as "general" and
paragraph 10 as "specific". Paragraph 12 is the only
provision of the contract which deals specifically with
forum selection for dispute resolution. It is, in fact,
specific and not general. Under paragraph 12 "all disputes"
arising out of Agreement or in any manner pertaining to the
dealership are to be arbitrated. Paragraph 10 deals at most
with remedies [as opposed to forums] available under the
UCC. Reference to UCC remedies does not identify a forum for
the enforcement of those remedies. It is, of course, true
that parties to an arbitration agreement may waive their
right to arbitrate and proceed in court, but where one party
insists on the right to arbitrate, as here, that right must
be upheld.
VIII. THERE IS NO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
EXCEPTION TO ARBITRATION.
Docutel-Olivetti erroneously asserts that "credit
claims are excluded from the general arbitration provision
of the Agreement". Docutel-Olivetti fails to distinguish between
remedies and tribunals [forums] for dispute resolution.
Remedies comprise damages, orders of specific
performance, injunctions, etc. Tribunals comprise courts,
administrative agencies and arbitration panels.
This distinction is carefully maintained by the Uniform
-18-

Commercial Code (UCC). There is no UCC exclusion of
arbitration. Resort to a court is not compelled by the UCC.
Docutel-Olivetti argues that there are references in U.C.A.
70A-2-723O) to a "court*1 and not to arbitrators. This
argument is entitled to no weight because U.C.A. 70A-1201(1) states:
"Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding
includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in
equity and any other proceedings in which rights are
determined. (Emphasis supplied.)
An arbitration proceeding is certainly embraced by the
UCC in the use therein of words such as "courts", "action",
etc. The use in paragraph 10 of the Agreement of "remedies"
available under the UCC is best understood by reference to
U.C.A. 70A-1-201(34) which states that the term "remedy"
... means any remedial right to which an aggreived
party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.
Docutel-Olivettifs analysis, therefore, is fundamentally flawed. Even by its own terms, the UCC is expansive
enough to refer and to be applicable in arbitration as well
as in state court.
Furthermore, the UCC is subordinate to the Agreement of
the parties. Docutel-Olivettifs thesis that the UCC
supersedes a contract to arbitrate is false. On the
contrary, U.C.A. 70A-1-102(3) states:
The effect of provisions of this act may be varied
by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this act
and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this
-19-

act may not be disclaimed by agreement....
(4) ... the words "unless otherwise agreed" or
words of similar import ... [do] not imply that the
effect of other provisions may not be varied by
agreement.... (Emphasis added.)
By its very terms, therefore, the UCC is subordinate to
a contract requirement to arbitrate disputes between
merchants. In fact, arbitration finds its greatest
application in commercial settings and is to be encouraged.
There are numerous cases involving the UCC and arbitration.
If there is an arbitration clause, the UCC does not prevent
arbitration. See Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial
Molding Corporation, 479 F.2d 345 (C.A. 10, 1973). The Court
found, under the FAA and the California UCC, an unsigned
arbitration provision was binding.
Also the 1985 UAA is a part of the UCC. See U.C.A.
70A-1-103, which states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this act, the principles of law and equity, including
the law merchant ... or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. (Emphasis
added.)
The Utah UCC and the 1985 UAA must, therefore, be read
as integrated and complimentary. The fact that DocutelOlivetti in its own contract designated arbitration as the
required forum or tribunal does not violate the UCC. The
remedies of the UCC are as available to Docutel-Olivetti in
arbitration as they are in a court.
In fact, Commercial Arbitration Rule 43, Appendix B-7
of Olivetti's Brief, states:
-20-

The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which
the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the
scope of the agreement of the parties....
Docutel-Olivettifs boot strap argument that the UCC
mandates resort to a court is ill-founded. As required by
the Agreement, "all disputes" mustf and should be,
arbitrated notwithstanding the UCC.
IX.

THE EXTENT OF BRADY'S PERSONAL LIABILITY
IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.

Docutel-Olivetti erroneously suggests that it may avoid
the affect of its arbitration provision by merely suing
Richard Brady personally under the Guaranty.
Docutel-Olivetti has sued Richard Brady on the grounds
that he is the alter-ego of Systems and, consequently, a
signatory to the Agreement itself. Clearly, if Brady is a party to
the Agreement, Brady's liability is arbitrable under the Agreement.
Also, Systems is entitled to have "all disputes"
arbitrated. The liability of Brady is contingent and is a
dispute arising out of the Dealership Agreement. The
liability, if any, of Systems must be first resolved in
arbitration before Brady can be said to have liability.
In addition, the 1985 UAA requires that "issues" be
submitted to arbitration. If the issue of liability of
Systems is submitted to arbitration, that issue is removed
from litigation as to all parties during arbitration.
Furthermore, although a writing memorializing an
arbitration agreement is required by the 1985 UAA, it is not
-21-

necessary that it be an integrated writing or that a party
seeking arbitration have earlier signed the writing. All
that is required is that the arbitration provision be in
writing. See, e.g. Medical Development Corporation, supra,
cases cited therein.
Finally, Judge Greene of the Federal District Court has
ordered that Brady be a party to the arbitration proceeding.
Docutel-Olivetti submitted the issue of Brady f s claim to
arbitration to Judge Greene and Judge Greene has ruled that
both Brady and Systems are entitled to arbitration. The
Tenth Circuit appeal will resolve with finality the issue of
Brady's right to arbitration.
X. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI WAS REQUIRED TO PREPARE
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Docutel-Olivetti suggests that Systems and Brady did
not comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice of the Third
Judicial District and are, therefore, barred from arguing
that the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law
is reversible error. The preparation of documents under Rule
4 here was the responsiblity of counsel for the party
obtaining the ruling, namely counsel for Docutel-Olivetti.
(R. 108,109).Systems and Brady complied with their
obligations in objecting to the lack of Findings and
Conclusions in District Court. (R. 102-104).
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are required
because the Utah legislature, at U.C.A. 78-31a-4, has
mandated that a court "shall determine those issues and
-22-

order or deny arbitration accordingly." (Emphasis provided.)
Consequently, the District Court is under a legislative
mandate to make its findings and enter its conclusions in
conjunction with its resolution of issues. Its failure to do
so here is reversible error.
XI. A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT REQUIRED TO
OBTAIN A SUBSTITUTE RECORD ON APPEAL.
Docutel-Olivetti suggests that Systems and Brady have
waived the Trial Court's error in not approving a substitute
record because it did not bring a petition for a writ of
mandamus. A writ of mandamus is a permissive remedy under
Rule 65B and may be obtained where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover, mandamus is not
available as a substitute for appeal. See Commercial
Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678 (Utah, 1982) and
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission,
659 P.2d 1065 (Utah, 1983). Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy available in certain circumstances, but not here.
XII. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI1S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT MERIT AND PREMATURE.
Docutel-Olivetti also requests attorney's fees under
the Agreement, although Docutel-Olivetti is in continual
breach of that Agreement by failing to proceed to arbitration. Docutel-Olivetti is not meritoriously entitled to
attorney's fees, especially in light of its abusive
procedural tactics. The issue of attorneyfs fees may be
advanced by Docutel-Olivetti only when, and if, Docutel-23-

Olivetti prevails on the merits of its claim. The merits of
Docutel-Olivettifs claim are not before this Court, were not
before the District Court and should properly be in
arbitration. Docutel-Olivetti is not presently entitled to
an award of attorney's fees under its Agreement or on any
other grounds.
CONCLUSION
Both state and federal law interpret agreements so as
to favor to arbitration. Unless a particular disputes is
explicitly and expressly excluded from arbitration,
arbitration is to be ordered. This supports the state and
federal policy of moving parties to an arbitration agreement
out of court and into arbitration quickly and inexpensively.
Docutel-Olivetti, unintimidated by its earlier rebuke and
fine by this Court (A.108), continues to create numerous
frivolous procedural roadblock. Docutel-Olivetti advances no
meritorious reasons why the claims between the parties
should not be arbitrated. The proceedings in this case
underscore the wisdom of the rule enunciated by this Court
in Lindon City, supra. This Court, therefore, should order
arbitration of all disputes and stay the litigation below
until the disputes are resolved in arbitration.
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I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, postage
prepaid, to Gordon R. McDowell, 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this ~2.2*-
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Before Honorable Monroe G. McKay, Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour,
and Honorable John P. Moore, Circuit Judgesf United States Court
of Appeals
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
BETWEEN DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation; RICHARD BRADY, and
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
DICK BRADY SYTEMS, INC., a Utah
corporation, and RICHARD BRADY,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
Cross-Appellants,
Nos. 85-2349 &
85-2460

v.
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant
Cross-Appellee.

This matter is before
appellant

and

the

court

cross-appellant

on

the

applications

of

to vacate our order of October 7,

1985, dismissing the appeal and cross-appeal*
Upon consideration thereof, motions are granted*
that

We conclude

the notice of appeal and notice, of cross-appeal were timely.

It is ordered that the order and judgment entered October 7, 1985,
is
That

vacated
portion

application

insofar
of
for

the
an

as it dismisses the appeal and cross-appeal.
order

denying

the

defendant-appellant's

emergency stay of the district court's order

remains in full force and effect.
It is further ordered

that

the

mandate

issued

October 7,

^

HOWARDr K. PHILLIPS
Clerk

1985, is recalled.
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
November 4. 1985
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City. Utah

84102

Docutel-Olivetti Corp.,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
V.

No. 20835

Dick Brady Systems. Inc.. Richard
Brady and Does 1 through 10.
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondent's motion to remand to determine bond on
appeal and to set dates for filing briefs, having been
considered, it is hereby ordered that the same be, and
hereby are both denied as frivolous and attorney for
respondent is ordered to personally pay to the attorney for
appellant the sum of $150 as and for attorney's fees
forthwith.

Geoffrey J. Butler
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Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. #2180
Attorney for Plaintiff
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 272-0309
IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

3rd DISTRICT COURT
Civil No. C85-506

DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
et ai.

DOCKET NO.:
Defendants-Appellant.
The Plaintiff hereby moves the Court to dismiss the appeal
filed by the Defendants on the grounds that the case is not
appealable because a final judgment has not been entered in this
matter on the Plaintiff's Complaint, and this appeal is interlocutory in nature.

Furthermore, the Appellant has not filed a super-

sedas bond and the appeal would in effect act as a stay of the
Plaintiff-Respondent's right to have judgment entered on its credit
claims asserted in the Complaint.

Dated t h i s

/L'

day ot J u l y , i c JB5.
• \

i l
&

Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr.
A11o rney for P1a in t iff-Respondent
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The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Appeal to the
defendants-appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof in the
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to
defendants' attorney of record as follows:
Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
60 2 East Third South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
•)

this

'''-'

da

Y

of

Jul

Y ' 138^.

Gayla R. Caspar, Secretary
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1n

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
August 6. 19 8 5
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Lynn G. Foster. Esq.
John R. Merkling. Esq.
602 East 3rd South
Salt Lake City. Utah
84102

Docutel Olivetti Corporation.
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
Dick Brady Systems. Inc.. et al..
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20783

THIS DAY. R e s p o n d e n t s motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground
that the Order appealed is not a final order is hereby granted, and
the appeal is dismissed. The notice of appeal was filed while
objections to the order were pendirtg in the district court, and the
notice had no effect under Rule 4 ( b ) , Utah Rules Appellate Procedure

Geoffrey J. Butler. Clerk
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MOTION TO
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DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
et al.
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the case is not appealable because a final judgment has not been
entered in this matter on the Plaintiff's Complaint, and this
j| appeal is interlocutory in nature.
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19 ; as a stay of the Plaintiff-Respondent's right to have judgment
20 ; entered on its credit claims Asserted in the Complaint.
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States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to Appellants'
attorney of record as follows:
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Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF""*"
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL

vs.

DOCKET NO. 20835

DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
et al.
Defendants-Appellants.

Plaintiff and Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation submits
the within Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the
appeal herein.
STATUS OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
On January 24, 198 5 Respondent filed its Complaint in the
Third Judicial District Court against Dick Brady Systems, Inc., and
against Richard Brady.

That Complaint is a credit collection

claim alleging in substance that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. had refused 'to pay for goods had and received by it from Respondent.
Richard Brady was sued on a personal guaranty in which he guarantee
the debts of Dick Brady Systems, Inc.•
The Appellants were served with process on January 26, 1985
and on February 12, 1985 the Appellants filed a Motion for Dismissa
or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration.

Appellants' Motion was

heard on May 24, 1985 and on June 10, 1985 Judge Homer F. Wilkinsor
entered his order denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss the pro-
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1 | ceedings and further denied the Motion to Stay the proceedings
2 | pending arbitration.
3 |

On July 8, 198 5 Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal of the

4 | June 10, 1985 Order and that appeal was assigned Docket No. 20783.

5

The Notice of Appeal was filed in 20783 prior to entry by the

6

court of its Order dated July 19, 1985 on Appellants' Motion to

7

Reconsider the June 10, 1985 Order.

8

filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Supreme Court in Case

9

No. 20783 and on August 6, 1985 the Supreme Court entered its Order

On July 10, 1985 Respondent

10

granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and dismissed

11

Appellants* appeal in Case No. 20783.

12

Appellant again filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's

On or about August 8, 1985
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On or about June 14, 198 5 Appellants filed its Answer and
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13 June 10, 198 5 Order and that appeal has been assigned the within

16 Counterclaim in the Third District Court.

Respondent has responded

17

to that Counterclaim. Appellants have refused to grant any discover}

18

in the District Court on the grounds that its various notices of

19 appeal divested the District Court of jurisdiction.

Respondent has

20 asked the District Court to compel Appellants to grant discovery.
21 Appellants are resisting that motion on the grounds that the Distric
22 Court does not have any further jurisdiction in the case because
23 of the pending appeal herein.
24 j

25
26

ARGUMENT
There Is No Final Judgment Or Order
From Which An Appeal Herein Might Lie

27
28
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Rule 4 U.R.A.P. provides for an appeal of final judgments
or orders.

It is hard to imagine any proceedings less final than

the proceedings presently pending before the District Court.

The

parties have barely gotten beyond the pleading stages therein
and Appellants have even refused to grant discovery to Respondent.
The Utah Arbitration Act Effective
Apri1 lf 1985 §78-31a-l et. seq.
Does Not Grant Appellant The Right
To Appeal Herein
Appellants rely on §78-31 (a)-19 U.C.A. as confering jurisdiction on the Supreme Court for its appeal.

§78-31(a)-19 does not

by its terms provide an appeal of an order denying a Motion to
Dismiss a Complaint nor from an order requesting a stay of proceedings.

Moreover, §78-31 (a)-19 provides that an appeal may be

taken "as provided by law for appeals."

The law providing for

appeals is found in Rule 4 U.R.A.P., appeal from a final judgment
or order of a court/ and in Rule 5 U.R.A.P. providing for interlocatory appeals.

As pointed out above, the proceedings before

the District Court below are anything but final.

Nothing in the

Utah Arbitration Act permits an immediate appeal from denial of a
Motion^ to Dismiss a Complaint or denying a motion to stay the proceedings below.

Appellants may ask the Court to review the matter

under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. but have failed to do so.
The Utah Arbitration Act became effective after Respondent's
Complaint was filed and served in the proceedings below.

The Utah

Arbitration Act in existence prior to §78-31 (a) et. seq. did not
contain the appeal provisions of §78-31(a)-19.

-3-
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If that section is

1 I a rule of substantive law mandating immediate appeals depriving

2

the District Court of further jurisdiction in the matter, then

3

that section does not apply to the case herein which was on file

4

before the effective day of the Act.
CONCLUSION

5
6
7
8
9

For the reasons set forth above the Court should enter its
order dismissing Appellants' Appeal herein.
DATED:

0

10
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

11
12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
13 ;i
z
<

5

The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and

14
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Respondents

15
Motion, etc. to the Appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof

X

2

16
in the United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to

17
Appellants' attorney of record as follows:

18
19
20
21

Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
this 22nd day of August, 1985.

22

^«/A rf- &f'-J/L&\

23
24
25
26
27
28
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

H7M

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
September 3. 1985
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Lynn G. Foster. Esq.
John R. Merkling. Esq.
602 East 3rd South
Salt Lake City. Utah
84102

Docutel Olivetti Corporation.
Plaintiff and Respondent.
V.

No. 208 3 5

Dick Brady Systems. Inc..
and Richard Brady.
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondent's motion to dismiss appeal, having been
considered, it is hereby ordered that the same be. and
hereby is, denied and the case is advanced on the calendar.
All briefing is to be accomplished within 60 days.

Geoffrey J. Butler

A118

LYNN G. FOSTER, #1105
JOHN R. MERKLING, (12 2 39
Attorneys for Defendants
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-5633
IN THE SUPREME COURT OE
THE STATE OE UTAH
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. MERKLING
vs.
Docket No. 20783

DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
et al. ,
Defendants, Appellants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
John R. Merkling, having been first duly sworn deposes and
says:
1.

I am an attorney for the Petitioners in the above-

entitled matter.
2.

On the 24th of May, 1985, I was present at a hearing on

Defendants1 Motion entitled "Motion for Dismissal or Stay of
Proceedings Pending Arbitrati on".
3.

I heard the arguments presented to the court by Lynn G.

Foster on behalf of Defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. and Richard
Brady, and the arguments presented by Gordon McDowell on behalf of
Plaintiff Docutel-Olivetti Corporation.
4.

Prior to the hearing, I had prepared nn extensive typed

outline of an argument for Mr. Foster's use at the time of hearing.
-1

In the ordinary course of business, Mr. Foster, to my personal
knowledge, supplemented my extensive outline, in his own handwriting and before the hearing.
5.

I am personally familiar with and have knowledge of the

typed notes which I prepared and the supplementary handwritten
notes which Mr. Foster prepared. I examined them both before and
after the hearing on May 24, 1985.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the first page of the

notes referred to which are in the handwriting of Mr. Lynn G.
Foster. I saw this page both before and after the hearing before
Judge Wilkinson.
7.

In connection with the hearing, Mr. Foster read

extensively from the notes which he and 1 had prepared.
8.

I recall hearing Mr. Foster, in commencing the argument,

read from Exhibit "A" and explicity call the Court's attention to
the issue of whether the Court should order arbitration.
9.

Later during Mr. Foster's argument, based upon the

aforementioned notes, Mr. Foster called Judge Wilkinson's attention
explicity to the applicability of the 1985 Utah Arbitration Act,
U.C.A. 78-3 la-1f et seq., which had become effective on April 29th,
1985.
10.

Based on the arguments which T heard before Judge

Wilkinson, the issue of compelling arbitration under the new 1985
Utah Arbitration Act was explicity raised and argued before Judge
Wilkinson.

/

DATED this

£'2

day of July, 1985
/ /

'JOHN R. ME RKLING

&X(..

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this c^ c V -^day of July,
1985.

- NOTARY PUBLIC
"7/
My Commission Expires: 5 .,_/. ,>-?

MAILING CRRTIF^CATE
I hereby certify that 1 mailed n true and correct copy o£
the foregoing Affidavit of John R. Merkling, postage prepaid, to
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84117, on this J^iK'dny of July, 1985.

Swtdtf

H. /-£&U£*7

(7d7*~A,

^I^TS

s^?>^^

fl^-J^

thrijpz^

Cg>rP.

/&<r&c2kP

a ^

/ft'irtvjf^.
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Exhibit-

"A"

LYNN G. FOSTER, #1105
JOHN R. MERKLING, #2 239
Attorneys for Defendants
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-5633
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN G. FOSTER

Plaintiff,
vs .

Docket No. 20783

DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Lynn G. Foster, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am an attorney for the Defendants in the above-

entitled matter.
2.

On May 24, 1985, Defendants1 motion for an order

compelling arbitration entitled "Motion for Dismissal or Stay of
Proceedings Pending Arbitration" was heard by Judge Homer J.
Wilkinson.
3.

Defendants' Motion had been filed prior to the effective

date of the present Utah Arbitration Act, IJ.C.A. 78-31A-1, et seq.
However, on the date of the hearing the new [198rj] Utah Arbitration
Act was effective. This fact was brought to the attention of the
Court and the ruling of the Court was based on the Court's
-1-

understanding of that Act.
4.

On May 24, 1985, Judge Wilkinson announced his decision

from the bench denying Defendants an Order compelling arbitration.
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., was ordered to
prepare an Order. A copy of a first minuLo entry is attached hereto
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
5.

On about May 29, 1985, Mr. McDowell submitted a proposed

Order. A copy of a first proposed Order attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" and incorporated herein by reference.
6.

On about May 31, 1985, Defendants filed an "Objection to

Proposed Order and Motion to Clarify", pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial District Court, which
requires objections to a proposed Order to be filed within five
days of the submission of the proposed Order [and, therefore,
before an Order is signed or entered]. A copy of Defendants'
Objection to the proposed Order and Motion to Clarify is attached
hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference.
7.

A hearing on Defendants' objections was immediately

scheduled and noticed for June 21, 1985. A copy of a Notice of
Hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein
by reference.
8.

It is the usual practice of the District Court to hold a

proposed Order for a particular length of time, usually eight days,
and, if no objection is filed within that period of time, to sign
the proposed Order. If an objection is filed within the stated
period, it is the practice of the District C^urt to hold the Order
until the objection is heard.
-2-

9.

Through a clerical error at the District Court,

Defendants' objections to the proposed Order were not brought to
the attention of Judge Wilkinson. Consequently, contrary to the
practice of the District Court, Judge Wilkinson signed Plaintiff's
proposed Order on June 10, 1985 [the June 10 Order]. A copy of the
June 10 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated
herein by reference.
10.

After the Order was signed, Defendants did not

explicitly file a Motion under Rule 52(d) or Rule 59(e), both of
which contemplate a Motion filed after the entry of judgment.
11.

On June 21, 1985, Judge Wil<inson heard Defendants1

objections to the first Order, as well as other motions of the
parties not relevant at this time.
12.

From the bench, Judge Wilkinson rendered his decision

and ruled explicity that Rule 52 did not apply in this situation. I
was instructed to prepare a proposed Order respecting the June 21,
1985 hearing [second proposed Order]. A copy of a second Minute
Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by
reference.
13.

On June 24, 1l)85, Delendants submitted the second

proposed Order. A copy of the second proposed Order is attached
hereto as Exhibit "G" and incorporated herein by reference.
14.

On June 26, 1085, Plaintiff objected to Defendants1

second proposed Order and fil?d a proposed Order on behalf of
Plaintiffs [third proposed Order]. A copy of the third proposed
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "H" and incorporated herein by
reference.

15.

During the next week to ten days, I personally

contacted Judge Wilkinson's clerk on more than one occasion to
determine if either the second or the third proposed Order had been
signed by the Judge, I was informmed by Judge Wilkinson's clerk
that Judge Wilkinson was suffering from an illness which was interferring with the completion oi' certain matters, including this
matter.
16.

Because Defendants1 original objections to the June 10

Or;ler were filed under Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice of the
District Court, and because Judge Wilkinson had explicitly stated
that Rule 52, in his opinion, did not apply, Defendants filed their
Notice of Appeal on July 9, 1985, within thirty days of the signing
and entry of the first Order and after the District Court had
rendered all decisions appealed from. A copy of the first Notice of
Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit "i" and incorporated herein by
reference.
17.

On July 19, 1985, after Judge Wilkinson had recovered

and returned to the bench, Judge Wilkinson modified and signed the
third proposed Order [the July 19 Order]. A copy of rhe signed
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "J" and incorporated herein by
reference.
18.

On July 31, 1985, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of

Appeal as to both the June 10 and the July 19 Orders, specifically
pointing out those portions of

the July 19 Order appealed from. A

copy of the Amended Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit
,f

K" and incorporated herein by reference.
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19.

The facts that the District Court had signed a proposed

Order before hewing timely filed objections, contrary to its usual
practice, that defendants were proceeding properly under Rule 4 of
the Rules of P: fctice of the District Court and not explicitly
under Rule 52 >: Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that Judge Wilkinson expressly ruled that Rule 52 did not
apply, made th -> proper date for filing a Notice of Appeal
questionable. It appears that Rule 4(c), of the Appellant Rules,
controls. On */\ ly 9, when the Notice of Appeal was filed by
Defendants in

his matter, all decisions appealed from had been

rendered by tie District Court, although a portion of the decision
rendered sti] i needed to be reduced to writing. T am of the view
that Rule 4(( ) does apply and that the original Notice of Appeal
was proper a-e timely.
20.

•;: July 31, 1985, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of

Appeal, particularly pointing out those portions of Judge
Wilkinson's line 21, 1985 ruling to which Defendants objected, as
(embodied by ''he July 19 Order, liven if Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P. were
applicable

^ these proceedings (and T hoiieve it is not), any

defect was

:ured by the filing of the Amended Notice of Appeal on

July 31, 19)5.
21.

On or about July 10, 1985, Plaintiff-Respondent,

ignoring t: e requirement that the Docketing Statement be on file,
filed a Mc* ion to Dismiss the Appeal on the erroneous grounds that
the appea1 was "interlocutory" (that is, discretionary under Rule 5
U.R.A.P.) i-nd that Defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond.
Plantiff cid not file a memorandum in support of its motion.

22.

Appellants-Defendants responded to the Motion of

Plaintiff-Respondent and to additional allegations made by
Plaintiff in Plaintiff's reply M^mornndum.
23.

This Court has not sustained any of the arguments for

dismissal advanced by Plaintiff.
24.

On August 6, 1985, this Court [apparently on its own

motion] dismissed this Appeal' pursuant to Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P.
Defendants have not had an opportunity to be heard and present
arguments in opposition to dismissal under Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P.
25.

After Defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed, and

before the Supreme Court entered any Order of Dismissal, Plaintiff
has attempted to proceed with discovery and has asserted that it
has accrued various discovery rights during this period. Unless
this appeal is reinstated, Defendants may suffer substantial
prejudice regarding their rights, and will certainly have to defend
against Plaintiff's assertion of its claims at additional costs and
delay. Plaintiff's counsel has already indicated his intention to
raise these issues in a loiter dated August 12, 198fi>, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Kxhibit "L" and incorporated herein by
reference. These circumstances represent just cause for reinstating
this appeal.
26.

Immediately upon receiving a copy of the August 6, 1985

Order, Defendants filed a further new (third) Notice of Appeal on
August 8, 1985, paying additional filing and docketing fees. A copy
of the August 8, 1985 Notice of Appeal showing payment of the
additional fees is attached hereto as Exhibit "M" and incorporated
herein by reference. A receipt Tor the additional docketing fee has
-6-

not yet been received from the clerk of the Supreme Court,
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught.

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

/ ^ day of

August, 1985

/p+~
)?k>.
)TARY PUBLIC
'Commission Expire
NOTARY

3

j»

[SEA.1

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Affidavit of Lynn G. Foster to Gordon R. McDowell,
Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake City, Utah
on this fJrfrl day of August, 1985.

a

s"7
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 272-0309
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
BETWEEN DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD
BRADY,

DOCKETING STATEMENT
No.

85-2L

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

\
/«

/.

vs.
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant and Appellant Docutel-Olivetti CotagS
("Appellant") pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules of Court of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit submits the
within Docketing Statement.
(a)
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the United States
District Court for the Central District of Utah ordering arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §4, enjoining prosecution of certain claim's
in the state courts of the State of Utah, ordering arbitration in
Salt Lake City, Utah, and ordering other arbitration proceedings
pending in Dallas, Texas transferred to Salt Lake City, Utah and
consolidated with arbitration proceedings ordered in the order
appealled herein.

(b)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 22, 1982 Appellant's predecessor in interest,

Olivetti Corporation, and Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ("DBS"),
Appellee herein, entered into a Dealership Agreement which contained an Arbitration Agreement which provided a forum selection
clause as follows:
"The arbitration hearing shall be conducted
at the regional office of A.A.A. closest to
the principal office of the party against
whom arbitration is demanded, unless Olivetti
and Dealer agree upon a different location."
2.

The regional office of the A.A.A. closest to Appellant's

principal office is Dallas, Texas.

The regional office of the

A.A.A. closest to DBS principal office is Denver, Colorado.

There

is no office of the A.A.A. in Utah.
3.

Appellant has never agreed to arbitration in any location

other than as called for in the Dealership Agreement.
4.

On or about March 8, 1985 DBS and Richard Brady ("Brady"),

another Appellee herein, filed a^ Demand for Arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association in Denver, Colorado asserting
claims against Appellant and asking for unspecified monetary
damages.

Appellant has never demanded arbitration against DBS.

Appellant responded to the demand and commenced to participate in
arbitration proceedings in connection with the claims asserted by
DBS against Appellant.

On May 2, 1985 Appellees filed a Change of

Claim with the A.A.A. asserting specific claims against Appellant.
Appellant responded to that Change of Claim.
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5.

After seeking input from DBS and Appellant concerning

the appropriate location for the arbitration proceedings, the
A.A.A. transferred the proceedings to Dallas, Texas,
6.

On or about February 22, 1982 Brady executed a personal

guaranty guaranteeing payment to Appellant's successor Olivetti
Corporation, of all indebtedness incurred by DBS for amounts due
for merchandise and services,
7.

On January 24, 198 5 Appellant filed a Complaint in the

Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah ("State Court Action"
hereafter) against DBS and Brady for payment of goods sold and
delivered to DBS.
8.

On or about February 12, 1985 DBS and Brady filed a

motion in the State Court Action based on the Utah. Arbitration
Act 78-31-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated and the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. for an order dismissing the Complaint
or staying its prosecution pending arbitration on the grounds
that the claim was subject to the arbitration provision of the
Dealership Agreement between Appellant and DBS and that Brady in»

dividually was entitled to protection of that agreement.
9.

On or about March 8, 1985 DBS and Brady filed a document

encaptioned "Petition to Compel Arbitration" in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Utah, the trial court
whose orders are appealled herein.

Although encaptioned as a

Petition to Compel Arbitration, the petition and relief requested
was limited to orders enjoining litigation by Appellant, directing
that arbitration proceedings take place in Salt Lake City, Utah,

-3a m

and requesting a specific method of appointing arbitrators, DBS
and Brady subsequently withdrew their request for a specific
method of appointing arbitrators.

By its terms the subject matter

of the Petition was limited to alleged controversies asserted in
Appellant's State Court Action Complaint.
10.

On May 2, 1985 a hearing on Appellees1 Petition to

Compel Arbitration was held before the Honorable Bruce Jenkins
in the district court below.

Judge Jenkins having been advised

that Appellees had already filed a motion to dismiss or stay the
proceedings in the State Court Action, directed Appellees to call
up their motion before the state court.

Judge Jenkins then con-

tinued the hearing until May 31, 1985.
11.

On May 24, 1985 Appellees' motion to dismiss or stay

proceedings was heard in the State Court Action by the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson.

After considering the matters and arguments

presented to the court, the court ruled that the specific language
of the Dealership Agreement with reference to collection matters
took precedence over the general arbitration clause in the Agreement and that therefore the claims asserted by Appellant in its

|

State Court Action Complaint wore not arbitrable.
12.

Sometime after May 2, 1985 the case below was transferred

from Judge Jenkins to the Honorable J. Thomas Greene. Appellees,
having learned of the transfer, renoticed a hearing on their
petition before Judge Greene.
13.

On May 30, 1985 Judge Greene heard arguments on Appellees

petition and over objection by Appellant that Appellees had
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1

submitted the issue to the state court, which had decided the

2

issue, Judge Greene ordered full briefing on the petition and

3

continued the hearing to June 27, 1985.

4

14.

5

Proceedings Pending State Court Determination of Arbitrability

6

Issues.

7

15.

On June 27, 198 5 Judge Greene heard arguments on

8

Appellees petition and Appellant's motion to stay and after argu-

9

ments announced his decision from the bench on that date, which

10

was subsequently reduced to writing on August 8, 198 5 and is the

11

order appealled herein.

12

16.

o

On July 12, 1985 Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Order

13

Re Transfer of Arbitration Proceedings with the district court be-

14

low.

15

9 »-

On June 21, 198 5 Appellant filed a Motion to Stay

That motion was set for hearing on August 22, 1985.
17.

On August 8, 1985 the trial court below entered its

16

findings of fact, conclusions of law and order appealled herein.

17

Judge Greene stayed the effective date of the transfer order until

18

August 22, 198 5 pending a hearing on the motion to stay.

19

20
21

18.

On August 22, 1985 Appellant filed a Motion to Alter

or Amend Judgment (Rule 59 F.R.C.P.) with the district court.
19.

At the August 22, 1985 hearing on Appellant's motion to

22

stay, Judge Greene continued the hearing until September 9, 1985

23

and consolidated that hearing with the hearing of Appellant's Rule

24

59 motion.

25

of the transfer order contained in the August 8, 1985 order to

26

September 9, 1985.

Judge Greene continued the stay of the effective date

27
28
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20.

On September 9, 1985 Judge Greene heard arguments

on Appellant's motion to stay and on its Rule 59 motion and ruled
from the bench denying both motions.

This appeal followed.

Judge Greene's September 9, 198 5 ruling was reduced to writing
on September 19, 1985.
(c)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Following are the principal questions presented on this
appeal.

Other questions may arise during preparation of the

briefs herein.
1.

Does a forum selection clause of an arbitration agreement

preclude the court from ordering arbitration in its own district
if that district is not the forum selected?
2.

Does the trial court have the power to disregard the

forum selected in a forum selection clause of an arbitration agreement over the objections of one of the parties to the agreement
regardless of countervailing or compelling circumstances which
might warrant such a change if the agreement were a commercial
contract rather than an arbitration agreement?
3.

If a petition to compel arbitration is filed in a forum

other than the forum selected in a forum selection clause of an
arbitration agreement, must that court dismiss the petition?
4.

If the trial court can engage in consideration of counter

vailing or compelling circumstances in disregarding a forum
selection clause in an arbitration agreement, does the filing of
a state court complaint on claims which a state court judge ruled
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were not arbitrable, and responding to a petition to compel
arbitration filed in the district court, constitute such compellin
and countervailing circumstances justifying disregarding the
forum selected?
5.

Can a party who submitted a Federal Arbitration Act

motion to stay proceedings before a state court nevertheless
submit the same claim to a federal court where the state court
refused its motion?
6.

Based on Appellees1 submission of the issues for a stay

of proceedings to the state court, did the federal court err
in refusing to stay its own proceedings?
7.

Does the district court have the power under either §3

or §4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. to enjoin either the parties or the court in proceedings pending in a
state court?
8.

Where a party has consented and is participating in

arbitration proceedings on claims asserted against it, did the
district court err in ruling that the party refused to arbitrate
claims under 9 U.S.C. §4 where the court finds that some allegations in a state court complaint which has as its nexus a credit
collection claim, could be construed as asserting arbitrable
issues even though the court finds that the nexus of the complaint
is not arbitrable?
9.

Where arbitration proceedings are already pending in

Dallas, Texas in which appellant is participating, may a federal
district court in Salt Lake City, Utah, notwithstanding a forum
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selection clause of an arbitration agreement which does not provide for arbitration in Utah, order consolidation of those proceed-]
ings in its own district with other matters which it ordered
arbitrated in Utah?
10.

Did the court err in compelling appellant to assert

claims against appellees even if appellant elects not to assert
those claims, and then order those claims arbitrated in Salt Lake
City, Utah notwithstanding a forum selection clause in an
arbitration agreement which does not provide for arbitration in
Salt Lake City, Utah?
11.

Does a party to an arbitration agreement submit itself

to the jurisdiction of the federal district court by filing a
credit collection complaint in state court against the other
party to the agreement, where the arbitration agreement requires
arbitration outside the jurisdiction of the federal district court?)
12.

Does an alter ego allegation in a state court complaint

which has as its nexus a credit collection claim, empower the
court to order a party to arbitrate claims with an individual even
though that individual has no arbitration agreement with the party
and has in fact denied the alter ego allegation in his answer to
the state court complaint?
13.

Did the court err in enjoining prosecution of a claim

against an individual who signed a personal guaranty guaranteeing
payment of obligations of a party to an arbitration agreement,
where that individual is not a party to the arbitration agreement,
and the guaranty permits suit against the guarantor without the

-8-

1
2

necessity of suit against the principal obligor?
14.

Did the court err in ordering arbitration of claims

3

where the petition filed by appellees did not ask for such relief

4

and requested merely that arbitration proceedings on claims it

5

asserted be held in Salt Lake City, Utah and asked for an in-

6

junction of claims asserted by appellant in state court?

7

15.

Is the court's order enjoining litigation of "any and

8

all disputes between the parties" over broad to the extent it

9

does not specify which disputes are to be enjoined?

10

16.

Did the court err in enjoining appellant's alter ego

11

claim.in the state court action and did it err in compelling

12

appellant to assert that claim in arbitration?

o
td ~

K

"5 2
> «-% 5

13

17.

Absent a determination by the state court that any

14

part of the First and Second Causes of Action of the State Court

<* S ^
z
ES

15

Complaint assert claims different from those arising under separat

SOH

16

credit agreements between appellant and DBS, i.e. arbitrable clain

17

are any valid issues ordered arbitrable which can be consolidated

18

with the arbitration proceedings pending in Dallas, Texas justi-

19

fying transferring those proceedings to Salt Lake City, Utah?

20
21
22

18.

Is the court's arbitration order invalid because it

lacks specificity as to what issues are to be arbitrated?
DATED:

October 1, 1985

23
24
25

Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

26
27
28
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing Statement to the
Plaintiff-Appellees herein, by placing said copy thereof in the
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to Appelleesj
attorney of record as follows:
Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
this 1st day of October, 1985.

J*'&</&
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 272-0309
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T
STATE OF UTAH
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING
FEDERAL APPEAL

DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1
through 10,

Docket No. 20835

Defendants-Appellants,

Plaintiff-Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation

("Respondem

submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Appellants1 Motic
for Stay During Federal Appeal.
OBJECTION TO APPELLANTS1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent objects to Appellants' Statement of Facts containec
in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay During Federal Appeal by paragraph number as follows:
1.

The Complaint below was filed on January 24, 198 5 and

s#erved on Appellants on January 26, 198 5.

The Complaint below is

for goods sold and delivered to Appelants.
2.

On February 12, 1985 Appellants filed a Motion for Dis-

missal or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration with the Court
below.

That motion was based on the Federal Arbitration Act 9

U.S.C. et. seq. and on the Utah Arbitration Act 78-31-1 et seq.
U.C.A.

Contrary to Appellants1 Statement of Facts, they did not

A1 1Q

file a Petition to Compel Arbitration in the Federal District
Court until March 8, 198 5 more than three weeks after filing the
Motion to Dismiss in the State Court below.
3.

A hearing was held before Federal Judge Jenkins on May 2,

1985 on Appellants1 Federal Court petition.

At that hearing Judge

Jenkins, having been advised that Appellants' Motion to Dismiss
was pending in the State Court, told the Appellants to call up for
hearing their motion.

Judge Jenkins did not differentiate between

Federal or State issues and did not specifically reserve the
issue of the Federal Arbitration Act for Federal Court determination.
4v

Judge Wilkinson's ruling appealled herein did not by its

terms limit itself to the Utah Arbitration Act.

Both Federal and

State issues were before the Court and the Court must be deemed
to have considered both issues in reaching its decision.
5.

The Federal District Court case was reassigned to Judge

Greene after Judge Wilkinson ruled on Appellants' Motion to Dismiss
appealled herein.

Judge Greene, over Respondent's objections that

Judge Jenkins had referred the matter to the State Court and that
Appellants had brought their Federal Arbitration Act claim to State
Court, reconsidered Appellants' Federal Court petition and on June
27, 198 5 announced the order of the Court from the bench in the
presence of counsel for Appellants and Respondent herein which such
order was memorialized in writing on August 8, 1985, a copy of whicJ:
is attached to Appellants' Memorandum in Support of their stay filec
herein.

1

I.

2

APPELLANTS' DILEMMA ON THIS APPEAL,
IF ANY, IS OCCASIONED BY THEIR OWN
FORUM SHOPPING AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED AS GROUNDS FOR STAYING
THIS APPEAL

3
4 |:
5 f

Judge Greene enjoined the parties from litigating in the Stat

6 j Court all issues other than those issues which the "State Court
7

rules are claims under separate credit agreements for collection

8 I of unpaid accounts or otherwise pursuant to paragraph 10 of the
9 I Dealership Agreement" (Order, August 8, 198 5, paragraph 2, page 2,
10

lines 7-9).

11 I

Appellants were present in Federal Court on June 27, 1985

12 || when the Court announced the order which was memorialized in writi:
o
ai ~

^

i5j
UJ

«/>

13 | on August 8, 198 5, and were aware of the extent of that ruling whe,

00

a 5S

*§£

14 || they filed the within Notice of Appeal under Rule 3 U.R.A.P.
i

<* S ^

15 (J

<* y *-

16 ;! plaint and refused to stay the proceedings below because paragraph

z
0

x£
53

°£«

Judge Wilkinson below, refused to dismiss Respondent's Com-

ji

17 j 10 of the Dealership Agreement provided for litigation of credit
18 'I collection claims and therefore was not subject to the general
19 j arbitration clause of paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement be'!

20 | tween the parties (Order appealled herein, dated June 10, 1985
j

21 I at p. 1, lines 20-28 and p. 2, lines 1-2) .
22 |

Appellants, having obtained a disfavorable ruling from Judge*

23 'j Wilkinson, next turned to Judge Greene to consider the same agree24 | ment, language and facts which were before Judge Wilkinson in the
25 1 State Court.

Unfortunately Judge Greene, unlike Judge Jenkins,

26 I failed to recognize Appellants' forum shopping for what it was and
27
28 I
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proceeded to rule on the merits.

Essentially Judge Greene vindi-

cated Respondent's position vis a vis credit collection matters and
held that those issues were not arbitrable.

Judge Greene did rule

that to the extent the State Court action alleged breaches of the
Dealership Agreement which were not breaches of credit collection
claims, those issues should be arbitrated.

He therefore enjoined

prosecution of Respondent's first two causes of action which he
deemed to be allegations of a breach of the Dealership Agreement
rather than collection matters.

Judge Greene went on to order that

arbitration proceedings take place in Utah on other matters between the parties.

Judge Greene's authority to order arbitration

in Utah in contradiction of the forum selection clause of the
Dealership Agreement between the parties, is the subject matter of
Respondent's presently pending appeal before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Appellants having now failed to stop the credit collection
claims before both Judge Wilkinson and Judge Greene, next turned
to this Court and filed a Notice of Appeal herein under Rule 3
U.R.A.P. even though the order appealled was clearly interlocutory.
As a consequence of this Court's refusal to dismiss the appeal undeJi
Rule 3 as being interlocutory, Appellants obtained from this Court,
without cost or detriment to them and without a ruling on the merits
by this Court, the very stay of the proceedings below denied them
by Judge Wilkinson and Judge Greene.
Having obtained the de facto stay of the proceedings below
and being advised that this Court had advanced the appeal herein

-4-
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on its calendar (Order of this Court dated September 3, 1985)
Appellants1 now ask this Court to make the stay permanent by deferring any further proceedings herein pending the outcome of the
appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
If Appellants are placed "in a dilemma of compelling them to
violate Judge Greene's injunction by proceeding to the merits befc
this Court" (Memorandum in Support of Defendants1 Motion for Stay
During Federal Appeal) it is a dilemma created not by this Court
but by Appellants own blatant forum shopping in these proceedings/
and by Appellants1 filing of the appeal herein knowing of Judge
Greene's ruling from the bench on June 27, 1985, memorialized
August 8, 198 5.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD IN FACT DISMISS
THIS APPEAL RATHER THAN STAY
THE PROCEEDINGS HEREIN
Appellants' motion herein to stay this appeal process and the
memorandum in support thereof clearly demonstrate the evil associated with forum shopping.

Appellants were denied relief first by

Judge Jenkins, then by Judge Wilkinson and finally by Judge Greene
yet nonetheless continue to seek de facto from this Court what the
have been denied by a series of judges, Federal and State, a stay
of Respondent's credit collection claim.

As argued by Respondent

previously before this Court, the appeal herein is interlocutory
and an appeal thereon should not have been granted.

Rather than

stay the proceedings herein, this appeal should be dismissed and
the matter referred back to the Trial Court for a determination on

-5-
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the merits of Respondent's credit collection claim.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September^ 1985,

'" x.
^^L

Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition, etc. to
the Appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United
States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:
Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South ••'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
this 19th day of September, 1985.

. , 4 / / / / / - / ^ vf7
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1
2
3

Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104
Salt'Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 272-0309

4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

5
6

STATE OF UTAH
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,

7
8
9
10

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1
through 10,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S
MOTIONS TO EXPEDITE APPEAL,
COMPEL DISCOVERY, APPOINT
A RECEIVER OR REQUIRE A BOND
PENDING APPEAL, AND TO DEFINE
SCOPE OF TRIAL COURT'S
JURISDICTION
Docket No. 20835

11

Defendants-Appellants.

12
Plaintiff-Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Responden

13

14 ; submits the within memorandum in support of its various motions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

15 !
16 |

On January 24, 1985 Respondent filed its Complaint below.

17;

A copy of that Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
1 8 |j
The Appellants were served with process on January 26, 198 5

1 9 !j

20 |
21 j
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

and on February 12, 1985 the Appellants filed a Motion for Dismissal* or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration, a copy of that
motion and the supporting memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B".

Appellants' motion was heard on May 24, 1985 and on June. 10,

198 5 Judge Homer F. Wilkinson entered his order denying Appellants
motion to dismiss the proceedings and further denied the motion to
stay the proceedings pending arbitration.
On or about June 14, 198 5 Appellants filed their Answer and
Counterclaim herein, a copy of that Answer is attached hereto as

Exhibit "C" .
On June 28, 198 5 Respondent served a Notice of Deposition
on Richard Brady scheduling his deposition for July 8, 1985.
(See Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. In
Support of Motions ("Mc Dowell Affidavit")).

On July 2, 1985 at

Appellants1 request Mr. Brady's deposition was rescheduled to
August 5, 1985 (See Exhibit "B" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit).

On

July 2, 1985 Respondent filed and served a Notice to Produce Documents and a Notice of Deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) U.R.C.P.
(See Exhibits "C" and "D" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit).

On July

19, 198 5 Respondent served Interrogatories, Request for Admissions
and Request for Production of Documents on Appellants (See Exhibit
"E" of the Mc Dowell Affidavit).
On July 8, 1985 Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal of
the June 10, 198 5 order and that appeal was assigned Docket No.
20783.

The Notice of Appeal was filed in 20783 prior to entry by

the court of its order dated July 1CJ, 1985 on Appellants' motion
to reconsider the June 10, 1985 order.

On July 10, 1985 Respondent

filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Supreme Court in Case
No. 20783 and on August 6, 19B5 the Supreme Court entered its order
granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and dismissed
Appellants1 appeal in Case No. 20783.
On August 5, 1985 Appellants failed to appear at their deposition and further failed to deliver the documents requested in the
notice to produce documents and further refused to grant any discovery below on the grounds of the pending appeal in Docket No.
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20783 (See Exhibit "F" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit).
On August 8, 198 5 Respondent filed a motion to the Court
below for an order compelling discovery and for sanctions.

On or

about the same date Appellants filed a new Notice of Appeal which
was assigned the docket number herein, 20835.
On August 15, 1985 Appellants filed a Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal in Docket No. 20783.

On August 22,

1985 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal No. 20835.
On August 23, 19 8 5 Respondent's Motion to Compel Discovery wa
heard by Judge Wilkinson who denied the motion because he had been
divested of jurisdiction by the various appeals filed by Appellant
herein.

That ruling was memorialized on September 6, 1985 (See

Exhibit "G" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit)'.
On September 3, 1985 Appellants' Motions to Reinstate Appeal
No. 20783 and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal No. 20835 were
heard by this Court.

On September 3, 1985 this Court denied the

Motion to Reinstate Appeal Number 20783 and denied the Motion to
Dismiss Appeal Number 20835.
POINTS, AUTHORITIES
AND ARGUMENT
I.
The Appeal Herein Although Granted Under Rule 3 U.R.A.P.
By This Court Is Interlocutory
The proceedings below have not been completed.
ants have refused to grant discovery below.

Indeed Appell

All that has taken pi

below is a Complaint, denial of a Motion to Dismiss or Stay
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Proceedings and an Answer and Counterclaim.
this appeal is interlocutory.

By any definition,

Kennedy v New Era Industries, Inc.

600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979); Salt Lake City Corporation v Layton 600
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979); Pate v. Marathon Steel Company 692 P.2d 765
(Utah 1984) .
II.
The Appeal Herein Being Interlocutory Has Not Divested
The Trial Court Of Jurisdiction Below And The Trial
Court Should Be Allowed To Continue The Proceedings
Below Including Discovery Proceedings Pending
The Appeal.
Generally an appeal is taken from a final judgment into which
is merged all of the former proceedings.

Since the appealable

judgment contains all of the proceedings an appeal naturally brings
the Trial Court's participation to an end until such time as the
Appellate Court remits the proceedings.

In this case, however,

no final judgment on the merits has been rendered and much of the
proceedings including discovery need to be completed.

Appellants

take the position that an appeal of any issue totally deprives the
District Court of jurisdiction.
An analogous situation has been presented in domestic relations
cases in Utah.

In those cases, although there may have been a final

determination as to some issues, e.g. property matters, support,
etc., an appeal of that judgment does not divest the District Court
of jurisdiction with respect to unresolved matters.

(See generally

Peters v Peters 394 P.2d 71 (UT. 1971); Warren v Warren 642 P.2d
385 (UT. 1982) .
-4-
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In Grand Central Mining Co. v Mammoth Mining Co, 36 Utah 364,
104 P. 573 (UT

) appellants argued that an appeal of a counter-

claim stayed proceedings on the original Complaint and objected
to certain orders entered therein by the District Court.

This

Court held that only the counterclaim issues were before it and
only those issues were stayed below and the Trial Court retained
jurisdiction to proceed on the Complaint itself.

The Court held:

"The case reviewed by us embracing only the issues
and the proceedings involved in the counterclaim,
and which were necessarily adjudged by us to be independent of, and separate from, the then untried
and undetermined issues raised by the complaint,
we do not see wherein the district court was without jurisdiction to proceed as was done, especially
since its action, was not arrested nor stayed by a
supersedeas bond or otherwise."
Grand Central Mining Co. v Mammoth Mining Co.
Id. at 577
The District Court1s jurisdiction is provided in Article VIII
Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah and in §78-3-4 U.C.A.
§78-3-4 grants the District Court jurisdiction in all matters civi
and criminal not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited b
law.

Under the Constitution and the statute the trial court canno

be divested of its jurisdiction by the filing of an appeal.
District
Since the/\ Court cannot be divested of its jurisdiction what
Appellants actually claim is that the appeal of the June 10, 1985
order acts as a stay of all other proceedings below./, including
discovery, a "supersedeas".

Supersedeas in defined in Blacks Law

Dictionary 5th ed. as follows:
"The name of a writ containing a command to stay the
proceeding at law."

The text writers explain the relationship between an appeal
and supersedeas as follows:
"Originally supersedeas was a writ directed
to an officer, commanding him to desist from
enforcing the execution of another writ which
he was about to execute or which might come
into his hands. It is now often used
synonymously with a stay of proceedings, and
is employed to designate the effect of an
act or proceeding which of itself suspends
the enforcement of a judgment."
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §634
In these proceedings there has been no judgment or order upon
which an automatic stay on appeal would issue.

What Appellants

urge is that the entire proceedings be stayed not just the order
appealed from.

The text writers answer this assertion as follows:

"... the general rule under modern statutes
in most jurisdictions in this country is
that the writ of error or appeal does not
of itself operate as a supersedeas."
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §365
There is no provision in Utah statutory law permitting supersedeas
in these proceedings.

The text writers state:

"In the absence of express statutory authorization, it is apparent that the appellant
is not entitled to supersedeas or stay of
proceedings as a matter of right."
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §366
The only provisions for supersedeas (stay of proceedings)' in
Utah law are found in Rule 6 2(d) U.R.C.P. where a stay may be obtained from execution of a judgment; in Rule 5(d) U.R.A.P. where
discretionary review from interlocutory orders is provided; and
under Rule 8 U.R.A.P. where an application for a stay of the
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judgment or order of a District Court is provided.

In each of

these cases an application must be made and each provides for posting of a bond.

Nowhere is there any authority that filing an appea

on an order of the type appealled from herein, automatically stays
the trial court proceedings.

It cannot be the rule that by filing

an appeal on any issue all proceedings grind to a halt without any
protection to other parties in litigation.
This Court should order as it could have ordered upon consideration of a Rule 5 U.R.A.P. request for an interlocutory appeal,
that only the issue of arbitration will be considered and that the
trial court retains jurisdiction of all other proceedings including
discovery.

If this Court determines that the trial court has been

divested of jurisdiction by this appeal or that the entire proceedings below should be stayed pending the appeal then it should protect Respondent during the pendency of this appeal, by requiring
Appellants to post a bond in the amount of $59,252.60 being the
amount prayed for in the Complaint and that such bond should remain
in place through conclusion of the trial

COULL

proceedings on re-

mand .
Respondent prevailed below and until this Court rules otherwise, the June 10, 1985 order appealled from herein must be presumed to be correct.

Appellants without any protection whatsoever

to Respondent, should not be able to obtain the relief denied below (Stay of Proceedings) by the simple expediency of filing a
Notice of Appeal herein.

Were such a result to prevail, the pro-

ceedings before the trial court would be a useless act and the part;

1 I;
2 I;
3

!iI,

4 I!

I

may just as well litigate their claims before this Court, which is
exactly what is happening herein.
III.
Respondent Is A Secured Creditor Of Appellant
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. And Is Entitled

5
6
T
I

To The Remedies Of A Secured Creditor Herein
The Dealership Agreement between Respondent and Appellant Dick

8

Brady Systems, Inc. (See copy of Agreement attached to Exhibit "A"

9

hereof) paragraph 10 provides inter alia:

10
11
12

"Dealer hereby grants Olivetti a security
interest in all Olivetti brand equipment
and inventory which Dealer presently owns
or may hereafter acquire and any additions
or accessions thereto and the proceeds thereof"

13
14
15
16
17
18

If an event of default by Dealer occurs
under any credit agreement with Olivetti,
Olivetti may, among other remedies, avail
itself of any remedy in effect now or at
the time of default under the Uniform
Commercial Code or any similar statute."
Respondent has perfected a security

interest against Appellant

19

Dick Brady Systems.

20

copy of the Financing Statement on file in Utah.

21

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a certified

The Affidavit of Gilbert R. Peterson filed below (see Exhibit

22 ||

"E" hereto) attaches thereto a copy of an invoice typical of all

23

invoices shipped to Appellants in connection with the purchase of

24

products from Respondent.

25 1

26 1

"A/R Terms:

That invoice provides:

Due in 60 days."

Mr. Peterson in paragraph 4, page 2 of his affidavit states:

27
-8-
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"When products are purchased by a dealer
those products are shipped and an invoice
is generated and mailed. In most cases the
invoice is mailed within a few days after
products are shipped."
Mr. Peterson goes on to state in paragraph 6, page 3 of his
affidavit that:
"There is nothing in my records reflecting
that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. did not receive
invoice 01-253052 nor any of the other 32 outstanding invoices. There is no record in my
files, nor am I aware of any record, reflecting that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ever objected to any of the 33 outstanding invoices
including the terms of payment thereunder."
Section 70A-2-607 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as supplemented) provides in part:
"(1) The buyer must pay at the contract
rate for any goods accepted."

"(3)

Where a tender has been accepted

(a) The buyer must within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy..."
Section 70A-2-606 Utah Code Annotated provides in part:
"70A-2-606.
goods.

What constitutes acceptance of

(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the
buyer

(b) fails to make an effective rejection
(subsection (1) of section 70A-2-602), but
such acceptance does not occur until the buyer
has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them..."
Section 70A-2-602(l) provides:

"Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender.
It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonally notifies the seller."
Section 70A-2-201(2) Utah Code Annotated provides:
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable
time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know
of its contents, it satisfies the requirement of subsection (1) against such party
unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is
received..."
The net effect of the above qi loted sections is that where
goods have been delivered and accepted by a buyer that buyer must
pay for those goods at the contract rate. Goods are accepted
when the buyer fails to reject the goods and so notify the seller
within a reasonable period of time thereafter of the rejection.
The terms of the contract are established where a confirmation
of the terms is sent to the buyer and the buyer fails to object
to the terms within ten days.
Mr. Peterson in his affidavit states that invoices are mailed
a few days after shipment of goods and that those invoices contain
the payment terms for the goods shipped.

Mr. Peterson further

states' in paragraph 6, page 3 of his affidavit that there are
Furesently 33 outstanding invoices totaling $49,147.70, the latest
of which is dated November 27, 1984. Mr. Peterson further testifies that there are no records reflecting that Dick Brady Systems
failed to receive the invoices or objected thereto.
More than a year has elapsed since shipment of

-10-
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many of the goods and invoices forming the nexus of Respondent's
claim against Appellants, were shipped and mailed.

Appellants hav<

failed to reject delivery of those goods or object to the payment
terms therefor.

Under the foregoing statutes Appellants must pay

for those goods,
§7QA-9~503 Utah Code Annotated entitles a secured creditor
such as Respondent, to take possession of collateral upon default,
Appellants have defaulted in payment for the goods sold to them ar
Respondent is entitled to possession of the collateral set forth j
the Financing Statement on file in Utah and under the Security
Agreement contained in the Dealership Agreement.
§70A-9-503 provides for either a writ of replevin or other
legal process to enable a creditor to obtain possession of the
collateral.

Respondent asks this Court to appoint a receiver to

account for, identify and take possession of the collateral as
provided in §70A~9-503 U.C.A.
IV.
Respondent Should Be Permitted To Conduct
Discovery During This Interlocutory Appeal
As set forth above, the proceedings below have barely begun
and Appellants have refused to grant discovery to Respondent.
Respondent is a secured creditor entitled to know what has
happened to its collateral and the legal reasons why Appellants re
fuse to pay for goods sold to them.

Respondent is entitled to

delivery of collateral securing Appellants' indebtedness to it.
Appellants have refused to give Respondent any information concern

-11-

i
the kind, extent, value, identity or location of its collateral.
Further Appellants deny that there is any credit agreement between
t 1 ie parties at all.
It is obvious that these Appellants intend to drag this appeal
out as long as possible (See Appellants' Motion to Stay Proceedings
Pending Federal Appeal filed herein dated September 16, 198 5 and
Appellants'Motion to Vacate and Strike Dates for Filing Briefs and
for Extension of Time filed herein and dated September 17, 1985) in
a concerted effort to obtain by procedural maneuvering that which
was denied them below (Stay of Proceedings).

Respondent should be

entitled to at least conduct discovery during this appeal.
Discovery will be necessary below if the Appellants are unsuccessful
appeal and will greatly expedite the trial below on remand. Res.pondent is certainly entitled to know the reasons why the Appellant*
claim they donft owe for goods sold and delivered to them and the
status and location of the collateral securing Appellants' indebtedness to Respondent.
Even if the Appellants were to prevail on appeal herein, the
discovery conducted would be necessary in arbitration proceedings
and would expedite those proceedings.
Respondent, having prevailed below, should not be deprived
of discovery by this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Appellants are fond of characterizing Judge Wilkinson's
order appealled herein as an "anti-arbitration" order.
the order is no such thing.

The order b; it.; ' *.-:Tn-12-
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In fact
i^tes that the

1

credit collection claims are not arbitrable.

It is neither pro

2

nor anti arbitration.

3

apply.

4

a sacred arbitration right and characterizing any position contrai

5

to their own as "anti-arbitration".

It says simply that arbitration does not

Appellants attempt to confuse the issues herein by invokir

6

A Federal and State judge have now looked at their arguments

7

and. both agreed that the credit collection claims are not subject

8

to arbitration.

9

under Rule 3 U.R.A.P., has caused the District Court to conclude

Unfortunately this Court, by granting an appeal

10

that it has no further jurisdiction below thereby giving to

11

Appellants the relief denied them by a succession of Federal and

12

State judges without any protection or consideration of the rights

13

of Respondent herein.

14

relief herein which this Court might grant to it.

Respondent by these motions suggests some
The Court might

15 ji consider other relief which would accomplish the goal of giving
16

Appellants an opportunity to convince this Court that the credit

17

collection claims are arbitrable without totally depriving Respond

18

ent of an effective remedy below.
Respectfully submitted this

19

0

/O

day of September, 1985,

20 !!
21
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

22
23
24

MAILING CERTIFICATE

25

The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and

26

correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum, etc. to the Appellants

27
28
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herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United States mail,
postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

^ i s /?

Lynn G. Foster
Attorney at Law
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
da
Y o f September, 1985.

j^Oo/Jg
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISIO..
In the Matter of the Arbitration
betwen DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD
BRADY,

ORDER

Petitioners,
vs.
Civil No. C85-280G
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION,
Respondent.
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the
27th day of June 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m.; Lynn G. Foster
and John R. Merkling appeared for Petitioners and Gordon R.
McDowell appeared for Respondent; the Court considered the
memoranda and documents filed by the parties and heard extensive
argument of counsel, after which the matter was submitted to the
Court for decision and taken under advisement.

The Court now

being fully advised, and having entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, enters the following Order:
1.

Docutel-Olivetti Corporation, Dick Brady Systems,

Inc. and Richard Brady, their agents, employees, successors,
assigns and attorneys are hereby restrained and enjoined from
proceeding in litigation in either Federal or State Courts as to
any and all disputes between the parties arising under the
Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the
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dealership created thereby, including to the extent applicable
claims which Docutel asserts against Systems and Brady under the
First and Second Causes of Action set forth in Docutelfs
Complaint, pending in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. C85-506, except to
the extent that the relief sought thereunder shall be ruled by
the said state court to be based upon claims under separate
credit agreements for collection of unpaid accounts or otherwise
pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement.

The

parties are enjoined from proceeding further in litigation in the
aforesaid State Court Complaint as to the Third cause of action
set forth therein.

Docutel may proceed in State Court as to the

Fourth Cause of Action set forth in the aforesaid State Court
Complaint as authorized by paragraph 10 of the Dealership
Agreement.

Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any

party from pursuing litigation remedies for enforcement of rights
arising under the Dealership Agreement, or rights under the
personal guaranty of Richard Brady, in connection with any award
which may be reduced to judgment pursuant to arbitration
proceedings.
2„

The parties, including Richard Brady, are ordered

to proceed to arbitration as to all disputes and claims arising
under the Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the
dealership created by the Dealership Agreement, including to the
extent applicable the First and Second Causes of Action, and the
claims set forth in the Third Cause of Action, in the pending
case in state court, Civil No. 85-506.

3.

Except as provided herein, it is ordered that

hearings and proceedings between the parties in arbitration as to
disputes and claims arising under or pertaining in any manner to
the dealership created by the Dealership Agreement as set forth
at paragraph 12 therein, shall be held and take place within the
District of Utah,

Effective August 20, 1985, unless this Court

grants Respondent's pending Motion to Stay, it is ordered that
all issues between the parties currently in arbitration elsewhere
shall be transferred to the District of Utah and consolidated
with the issues and matters which this Court has placed in
arbitration in the District of Utah pursuant to this Order.
4.

No costs or attorney's fees are awarded herewith

to any party.
DATED:

August O

, 1985.

J. /DHOMAS GREENE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

